Introduction
The existing literature on the centre-right in Eastern and Central Europe is small and fragmentary. Current published research amounts to an edited collection, 2 one book length treatment, which largely reviews prospects for democratisation, 3 several monographs on national cases, 4 and a small number of comparative papers. 5 A number of other works discuss the centre-right in the region as a subsidiary theme within accounts of topics such as economic transformation and the break-up of Czechoslovakia. 6 Critical, left-wing scholarship has also sometimes focused on East and Central centre-right as the key political vehicle for the restoration of capitalism and agent of transnational capital after 1989. 7 The paucity of literature on the centreright in post-communist Europe contrasts with the voluminous, detailed and often 4 nationalism, social conservatism and economic populism -termed the 'communist right' by Vachudová and 'communist conservatives' by Chan.
[ TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE] Moreover, actors across the region have themselves generated their own national discourses of 'rightness', which represent a further set of definitions to be considered.
In the Czech Republic, for example, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of former Prime Minister (and newly elected President), Václav Klaus, defined itself not only in terms of economic liberalism and anti-communism, but also as bringing the 'tried and tested' neo-liberal approaches of the Western right to a provincial society overly inclined towards collectivism. 13 In states such as Hungary and Poland, by contrast, 'right-wing' politics are understood at both mass and elite level in terms of Christian, conservative-national, national-populist or radical anti-communist positions, with free market parties constituting as a distinct 'West of centre', liberal camp.
14 Similar problems are posed by small agrarian parties, which were a feature of both the Hungarian and Polish party systems during 1990s, and recently made important electoral gains in Croatia, Estonia and Latvia. As the Scandinavian experience demonstrates, agrarian formations have the potential to evolve into ideologically distinct, centre parties. 15 In Romania and Bulgaria the initial dominance after 1989 of 'chauvino-communist' former ruling parties -or groupings that emerged from themsaw the 'right' emerge as heterogeneous 'democratic' alliances of traditionalist nationalists, historic parties, liberals and radical anti-communists. 16 grouping FIDESZ, the unstable Polish party system now contains two agrarian parties -the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) and the radical-populist protest party, SelfDefence). 32 This suggests that patterns of competition that separate the liberals and agrarians from the broader centre-right are more durable than individual parties themselves. 33 Underlying, is arguably a distinct pattern of East and Central European party and party system formation, in which the centre-right, in the absence of a strong class base, lacks the broad appeal and integrative ability of their West European counterparts. In certain respects, this is comparable to the historic pattern of party formation in Scandinavia, where weak, sectorally and regionally divided bourgeoisie produced an array of weak conservative liberal, agrarian and denominational parties, rather than a unified centre-right. providing only an illusion of choice and alternation. 42 Such issues are beyond the scope of this paper. What does seem certain, however, is that ideology plays an important role in both framing political action and giving cohesion and identity to political organisations. This is, arguably, particularly the case in periods of far reaching social and political change, such as post-communist transformation, when structural determinants may be weaker, levels of uncertainty higher, and political identities less well defined. The ideologies of East and Central Europe's new centreright(s) combine both historic discourses and newer ideas imported from Western contexts or developed locally during post-communist transformation. These ideologies can broadly be broken down into three key strands: anti-communism, conservatism (including for the purpose of this discussion nationalism and populism) and (neo-)liberalism.
Anti-communism is one of the few ideological tenets shared almost without exception across the diverse East Central European centre-right. Calls for radical decommunisation -often linked to vaguer aspiration of speeding up reform through decisive action -were among the most characteristic demands of emergent right-wing forces in Eastern and Central Europe in the early 1990s. In many states in the region decommunisation was also a key issue promoting differentiation in broad anti-regime coalitions and prompting the foundation of political parties, including parties of the centre-right. Centre-right parties have subsequently been among the keenest advocates of lustration procedures intended to screen those holding high public office for past collaboration with communist security apparatus (and in some cases to debar them 43 .
At a deeper level, however, anti-communism has been used by many centre-right 11 parties to frame left-left competition, which is depicted as a continuation of the struggle for regime change ('thick' or 'permanent' transition, 44 
The challenge of Europeanisation and globalisation
Many centre-right parties in Western Europe emerged on the basis of cleavages associated with classical socio-economic modernization and national state formation.
Centre-right parties in post-communist East and Central Europe have, by contrast, formed against a background of social, cultural and technological changes that can broadly be termed 'post-modernisation', many of which call into question the importance of the national state. 58 Of these globalisation and the related process of European integration are by far the most significant. 59 These processes not only they aggravate historical sensitivities in a region where the formation of national states was historically belated, contested or incomplete, but pose particular challenge to many parties of centre-right in the region. 60 Although few centre-right formations are actively opposed to EU membership, early comparative research on party-based euroscepticism has highlighted a tendency for them to be more eurosceptic than their counterparts in Western Europe. 61 
